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Altruism as a purely naturalistic phenomenon self-defeats the term altogether; 
however, theology also makes unsubstantiated claims that some behaviors are 
purely selfless. I will first define various conceptual forms of altruism and then offer 
explanations of the term from neurological, evolutionary and psychological 
investigations. Despite the position that altruism can be reduced to a fantastical 
impossibility bearing neither the arms of science nor theology, it is also a fallacy to 
separate it from a religiously derived supernatural altruism that carries no 
implications for the realm of morality. 
 
 Veined within the confused conflict 
between science and religion, morality 
attempts to edify itself as cause to 
disestablish evolutionary insights that tend 
to reduce humanity to products of chance 
and fitness. Deeply associated with human 
morality is the ambiguous concept of 
altruism; there are arguments that attempt to 
split its role between being a liberator of 
evolutionary beliefs and a defender of 
religious infallibility. While science claims 
that altruism is a self-profiting, genetically 
derived behavioral trait that has survived 
environmental pressures, theology tends to 
view it as evidence of Godly influence that 
denies humanity from being classified 
within phylogenetic clades. Considering 
these modifications to the concept of 
altruism as an armament, it is necessary to 
establish a clear understanding of what 
altruism is; its obscurity is that of a singular 
dialectal utterance that represents varying 
ideas with immensely differing implications 
for ideological debates. The typical usage of 
the concept of altruism within the scientific 
realm consequently self-defeats the term 
altogether, while proponents of theological 
beliefs make unsubstantiated claims that 
certain actions or behaviors are purely 
selfless. After clearly distinguishing the 
conceptual forms of altruism, explanations 
for rudimentary manifestations of the term 
can be discussed via neurological, 
evolutionary and psychological 
investigations; whereas the case for literal 
altruism is reduced to a fantastical 
impossibility bearing neither the arms of 
science nor theology, it is a fallacy separate 
from a religiously derived supernatural 
altruism and carries no implications for the 
realm of morality. 
 
Defining Altruism 
 The term altruism must initially be 
divided based on varying intensities of effect 
on the individual participating in behaviors 
or actions. The first is that altruism is 
unselfish concern or behavior promoting the 
welfare of another person/organism with 
absolutely no personal profit. This definition 
provokes discourse within philosophical and 
psychological categories, often inviting 
religious moralists to advocate for evidence 
of its manifestation in radically selfless 
actions such as in the case of fatal self-
sacrifice. The second is that altruism is 
concern or behavior that promotes the 
welfare of another individual/organism at 
some personal cost. This more unrestricted 
view of the idea does permit some personal 
benefit for the participant, whether initially 
or with delayed return. A subset of this 
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definition is biological altruism, which 
specifies that the cost to the individual is a 
reduction in reproductive capability. 
 
Evolution of Altruism 
 With the tenants of survival of the 
fittest being ones of selfish competitive 
behaviors, the notion of biological altruism 
ascends as a seemingly unacquainted trait. If 
genes for altruistic behavior were selected 
via environmental pressures, it appears 
counterintuitive for altruism to be 
propagating in a system built on self-
sustainability. At the core of natural 
selection, genes are the immortal component 
of a biological lineage; selfish genes must 
benefit generational inheritance whereas 
altruistic ones must hinder it.1 Dawkins 
proposes an explanation of altruistic 
behavior, however, as related to the idea of 
selfish genes; by his theory, each individual 
gene is a selfish component of an 
organismal vector. These vectors exist as 
survival machines and constitute a 
genetically designed environment that is 
assembled via cooperation within a gene 
pool. Additionally, a gene is not a singular 
entity, but exists as copies of itself contained 
within these organismal vectors. The 
presence of altruistic genes (ones promoting 
prosocial altruistic behavior toward other 
individuals) amidst selfish genes has the 
potential to self-profit all genes of the 
species if cooperation is occurring at the 
organismal level. 
 Several evolutionary theories attempt 
to explain the presence of altruistic genes in 
humans as products of successful fitness 
dependent on cooperation.2 Firstly, the 
theory of kin selection coincides with 
Dawkins’ selfish gene theory in that these 
altruistic genes could have arisen via 
cooperation between individuals with 
similar gene pools, such as relatives. This 
                                                          
1 Dawkins, 1989. 
2 Numan, 2015.  
idea is also synonymous with Hamilton’s 
inclusive fitness theory in which fitness is 
based on numbers of offspring individually 
produced and the behaviors that lead to 
others of the same species producing 
offspring.3 This, however, does not explain 
the existence of prosocial behaviors towards 
other individuals that are not relatives, or are 
different species altogether. Interspecies 
altruism disestablishes the notion of similar 
genetic material being the only motivation 
for altruistic behaviors, and introduces the 
idea of environmentally induced, mutually 
beneficial, cross-species interactions that 
could select for altruistic genes.  
The second theory is reciprocal altruism 
which may be explained more as a 
sociobiological construct in which delayed 
cooperation exists to encourage altruistic 
behaviors. With this insight, an individual 
enacts a behavior characterized by personal 
risk and associates it with a return of 
personal profit from the other organism that 
it interacted with. This makes altruistic 
interactions increasingly more likely if 
delayed returns are consistent and have 
greater reward than the initial input. Thirdly, 
group selection theory establishes that the 
early days of hominids were ones of 
competition over limited resources, and 
tribal affiliations arose with association to 
individuals requiring grouping to be more 
successful than other individuals, or to 
compete with other groups. Prosocial 
behaviors within the groups would be 
altruistic while between-group interactions 
would be selfish and competitive. 
Individuals lacking genes that would 
promote cooperative behaviors would not 
produce offspring and consequently the 
lineage would terminate. 
 While these theories all suggest that 
an ultimate selfish benefit surpasses any 
altruistic behaviors (regarding evolutionary 
3 Marshall, 2016.  
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fitness), it is sometimes difficult to reconcile 
certain behaviors within these explanations. 
Steyn, a published travel journalist, captured 
interactions between a lioness and a family 
of baboons that seem to deviate from the 
benefit-over-cost Hamiltonian formula. The 
lioness killed a mother baboon that was 
carrying a single male infant baboon. While 
beginning to devour her meal, the lioness 
easily noticed the escaping infant. Instead of 
a swift death, however, the lioness nurtured 
the baboon and acted as if pained by the 
circumstances.4 Her fitness was drastically 
reduced in this situation for numerous 
reasons: 1) She ignored the mother baboon 
(meal); 2) she ignored the infant baboon (as 
a meal); 3) she violently rejected mating 
advances of two male lions (she possibly 
may have been defending the infant 
baboon).  
 From a sociobiology standpoint, the 
protective actions of the lioness could be 
marked as confused maternal instincts by 
which the infant baboon in distress elicited a 
mistaken sympathetic response from her. 
The failure of this hypothesis is that it 
assumes that in this instance, the lioness has 
a propensity toward being biologically unfit, 
which is unlikely considering that the 
lineage of lions stretches back to the middle 
Pleistocene (.8-1.0 Ma), and modern maned 
lions evolved from a single lineage 320–190 
Ka ago.5 While the success of the lion rose 
through cooperative group hunting in prey-
rich ecosystems (Serengeti), the resilience of 
the species is notable within prey-scarce 
ecosystems (Kalahari). The edicts of 
population dynamics provide that organisms 
approach a carrying capacity based on the 
sustainability of their environment. In this 
case, a population of predator lions is only 
as successful in proliferating viable 
offspring as its prey are numerous or 
available. Killing an infant baboon would 
                                                          
4 Steyn, 2014.  
5 Yamaguchi et al., 2004.pp. 330, 338. 
reduce the potential biomass in the 
ecosystem that the lioness could feed on; 
that single infant will later become 
reproductively capable and provide 
exponentially more feeding opportunities. 
From this aspect, it is possible that altruistic 
prey-mercy toward infants is not a confusion 
of instincts, but an evolutionary advantage 
over predators that would otherwise 
completely reduce their prey population 
through non-selective killing and feeding.  
 The justification provided by 
population dynamics loses some stability 
when a helper individual sacrifices personal 
fitness to improve the fitness of a 
competitor. An adult elephant has been 
observed attempting to rescue an infant 
rhinoceros from a mire while being charged 
by the violent mother rhino.6 While 
Dawkins suggests that “unconscious 
calculations” via an “unspecified 
mechanism” manifest as compassion such as 
seen here, others suggest that “altruistic 
emotions of compassion, empathy and 
generosity” may be the missing link, “even 
if they serve ‘selfish genes’.”7 Emotion 
exists as a concept related to feeling that is 
often associated with the motivations of a 
mind; it is an element superseding genetic 
influences and residing rather in the 
organismal attribute of consciousness. 
Masson and McCarthy discuss the tendency 
for scientists to discourage the 
anthropomorphizing of animals which reigns 
from a denial of the influences of higher 
systems; these deserve as much attention 
within the altruism debate as rudimentary, 
selfish genes do. 
 
Neurology of Altruism 
 Within human social systems, 
individuals often attribute literal altruism to 
acts of kindness; a prime example is helping 
a homeless person. Not only does this 
6 Masson and McCarthy, 1995.  
7 Ibid. p. 165. 
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assume that no genetic fitness is gained by 
the altruistically acting individual, but 
absolutely no personal benefit is received. 
Advances in understanding of neurological 
systems can confidently map out empathic 
responses within the brain that lead to 
prosocial behaviors, such as this one. 
Studies have found that the anterior insula 
(AI) of the insular cortex is the epicenter for 
altruistic decision making.8 The AI has been 
theorized to be a “sensory-related region” 
which “mediates emotional and empathic 
experiences” whereas the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) is active with the AI and 
provides the drive for “motivated 
behaviors.”9 Finally projections onto the 
ventral pallidum (VP) from the nucleus 
accumbens and amygdala permit altruistic 
actions to occur via motor neuron output 
from the VP.  
 The complex theoretical circuitry 
provides a feedback system that activates 
reward centers of the brain in association 
with plans or actions that are empathically 
derived from the AI; physiologically, a 
reward of pleasure is self-produced from this 
process. This in turn denies that empathic 
actions derived from conscious motivation 
are truly altruistic if they provide a 
neurological benefit to the individual. 
Evidence of the role of AI in empathic 
response appears in a study in which 
individuals with lesions to this region had 
difficulty identifying if people in pictures 
(such as one with their toe being smashed 
under a desk) were suffering or not.10 
Failure to empathize leads to a decrease in 
likelihood to act altruistically on feelings of 
motivation (considering they are not there at 
all or are limited). Despite this, if an 
individual with no empathic motivation (no 
pleasurable neurological reward for altruistic 
behaviors) acts in a way that is perceived as 
                                                          
8 Op. cit. ref. 2. 
9 Ibid. p. 277. 
10 Op. cit. ref. 2.  
altruistic, the psychosocial realm is 
implicated in providing a selfish 
reinforcement of this behavior. 
 
Psychology of Altruism 
 Familiar within the psychoanalytical 
discussions are the manifestations of 
subdivisions of the mind: a tripartite of id, 
ego, and superego.11 Freud’s coined 
terminology presents the mind as a selfishly-
driven entity by which altruistic actions fit 
as similarly as they do into theories of 
reciprocal altruism. The id is primal desire, 
often for food or sex, with no regard for 
other individuals or for reality itself. The 
superego is considered the moral 
component, but some advocate that it is 
more in essence founded upon 
environmental factors; it is the subconscious 
proponent of societally influenced norms or 
expected behaviors, whether immoral or 
moral.12 The ego is the moderator between 
the two, which are often opposing entities of 
the subconscious mind.  
Considering a physiologically unbenefited 
individual acting altruistically (no 
neurological sensations of pleasure), actions 
taken would still be influenced by this 
underlying psychological system. Avoiding 
helping the individual amidst societal norms 
that promote altruistic behaviors as expected 
would make offense against the superego. 
Carveth explains that the “role of 
persecutory guilt (superego)” exists “as a 
defence against depressive guilt 
(conscience).”13 In this aspect, conscious 
guilt would arise if no altruistic action was 
taken. On the contrary proceeding with the 
altruistic action deviates from a negative 
psychosocial consequence, and fuels the 
desire of the superego; this in turn generates 
permissibility of the ego to substantiate the 
selfish desires of the id. Thus, unconscious 
11 Heffner, 2016.  
12 Carveth, 2015.  
13 Ibid. p. 210. 
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aspects of an individual disestablish the 
presence of literal altruism within the 
actions of someone lacking a conscious 
desire to act in a certain sacrificial or selfless 
way. 
 
Death and Altruism 
 Neurological and psychological 
theories establish that literal altruism is 
obstructed by an inevitable profit to self; this 
draws into question the nature of humanity 
which various philosophers have attempted 
to delineate within the periphery of morality. 
Thomas Hobbes proposed that the inherent 
selfishness of humanity was so evident that 
restrictive systems of government were 
necessary to avoid societal chaos. He 
personally dealt with the scenario of a 
homeless man asking for alms in 17th 
century London, which despite his views on 
the inherent selfish of mankind, he still 
aided the man. When asked if he would still 
have assisted him if governmental and 
societal restrictions were absent, he replied 
that he would because giving alms “doth 
also ease me.”14 Hobbes provided insight 
into the neurological interactions associated 
with prosocial behavior centuries prior to 
discovery. He also proposed that the only 
escape for mankind’s “perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power” was death. 
 Considering prosocial altruistic acts 
that lead to a fatal personal cost, the concept 
of literal altruism is observed in a new light. 
If the self dissipates from existence via 
actions that are altruistic, then selfish desire 
must also be absent from the action. Within 
the Hindu belief system, adherents face a 
personal reality that they are trapped with a 
cyclic reincarnation characterized by 
personal suffering. Here terminology of 
good karma translates as positive 
accumulating consequences of altruistic 
behavior which will lead to a more 
                                                          
14 Quoted in Goleman, 2006.p.  59. 
15 Hill, 2016. 77. 
advantageous state of reincarnation (a higher 
caste or a more affluent organism). 
Eventually, however, individuals reach a 
prescribed level of Karmic advancement that 
allows them a meditative transcendence to 
obtain omniscient knowledge. In this, they 
become like God and reabsorb into the 
Primal One (God) ceasing to exist 
altogether, but also simultaneously merge 
into an all-encompassing, but transformed 
existence. The dilemma that restricts literal 
altruism as being factualized here is that 
from another aspect of this situation, the 
transcending Hindu is simply selfishly 
avoiding a cyclic rebirth that is characterized 
by personal suffering by acting altruistically; 
this transcendence then falls more closely 
within the confines of reciprocal altruism by 
which a supernatural component is the 
reciprocating benefactor. This situation is 
identical to the individual lacking an anterior 
insula, who still acts selfishly at the root of 
prosocial behaviors as a mode of guilt 
avoidance. 
 
Altruism in Christianity 
 In response to Dawkins’ selfish gene 
theory, Hill notes the “tendency of 
sociobiologists to utilize reductionist 
thinking and not acknowledge the whole 
human person.”15 Dawkins’ reductionism 
prevents the permissible existence of higher 
order systems differing from their 
constituent parts (selfish genes); this 
ontological reductionism also leaves gaps 
filled with suprascientific reasoning.16 One 
such reasoning involves his proposal for 
delegating the teaching of behaviors that are 
unnaturally altruistic so as to improve the 
quality of a world that is relentlessly selfish 
and brutal. This lack of logical reasoning 
instigates an unnecessary attack on 
theological beliefs, forcing both 
evolutionary and theology thinkers to 
16 Hill, 2016.  
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definitively choose one incomplete and 
unsubstantiated ideology over another. 
Similarly, it would be unacceptable for 
theological entities to impose a God-of-the-
gaps argument on evolutionists who are 
considering theological beliefs. While 
Dawkins’ insight into the selfish 
components of genetic systems is 
methodologically sound, his expansion of 
reason onto higher-level systems lacks 
perspective and logic that could permit 
Christian theologians to accept these gene 
qualities as exclusively admissible within 
evolutionary thought. 
 Imagining that Christians could 
accept an all-encompassing, genetic 
selfishness as cause for all human behavior, 
including altruism, several biblical 
compromises of interpretation would be 
made. In the realm of misinterpretation of 
scripture, however, it is devisable to believe 
in part that reciprocal altruism and inclusive 
fitness are the only needed explanations for 
selfless behavior. If the selfish-gene is the 
sole motivator behind all prosocial behavior, 
it is impossible to accept the idea of divinely 
provided free-will. It would require a 
reconstruction of interpretation of imago Dei 
which Augustine characterizes as 
humanity’s possession of “reason, or mind, 
or understanding” that grants a superior 
distinction from the rest of created life.17 
Since these characteristics are ones of 
higher-order systems acting independently 
of selfish-gene influences, this interpretation 
of the image of God in humanity does not 
coincide with selfish gene theory.  
Calvinistic interpretation classifies the 
image of God under humanity’s 
conformation to “function” and “order” as to 
fulfill the image of God, rather than the 
“possession of powers of reason.”18 
Consequently accepting this position also 
                                                          
17 Quoted in Mahoney, 2011, p. 19. 
18 Mahoney, 2011, p. 20.  
19 Op. cit. ref. 17, p.  41. 
invites the belief in predestination since 
gene-influences, rather than free-will, are 
causation for all human behavior, including 
altruism, morality, and ethics. Despite this, 
Calvinist thought on the image of God in 
humanity still incites a belief in purpose, as 
associated with these suprascientific 
concepts of right and wrong, that would not 
logically interlock with the restrictive 
selfish-gene theory. 
 It is upon these suprascientific 
notions that a more complex view of 
altruism is formed. John Polkinghorne 
explains that while “kin altruism and 
reciprocal altruism are enlightening,” the 
human ability to act altruistically in response 
to situations considered wrong “are facts 
about the ethical reality within which we 
function as morally responsible persons.”19 
Explanations for a potential supranormal 
altruism (outside biological constructs) are 
present within a “Trinitarian framework” 
that is dependent on a diety that is 
“beneficent”.20 This view also relies on a 
third interpretation of imago Dei which 
attributes altruistic behavior as the 
manifestation of God’s prosocial, Trinitarian 
identity within humanity;21 this is an 
amplification of Augustine’s interpretation 
rather than a conflicting view that derives 
the motivation of altruistic behaviors from 
an inherent purpose of community. While 
Christianity identifies the singularity of the 
divine creator, the Triune of God, Jesus, and 
the Holy Spirit fill different roles to 
facilitate divine altruism as a behavioral 
influence in humanity. 
 While God persists in this view as 
benevolent and altruistic, Jesus exists as the 
incarnation of God’s intended altruism 
toward humanity. Dawkins’ invitation to 
actively instruct rebellion against genetic 
selfishness is ironically exemplified by the 
20 Barrett, 2015. p. 30. 
21 Mahoney, 2011. 
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incarnate divine altruism of Jesus; God’s 
image was embodied within a vessel with 
both the permissibility of selfish genes, and 
the divinity of supranormal altruism. Jesus 
provided the exemplification of God’s 
desired purpose for humanity which was a 
“major evolutionary step in the moral 
advancement of the human species.”22 The 
role of the Holy Spirit within Trinitarian 
altruism is to promote “inspiration of the 
heart” or “moral inspiration” by which 
altruistic actions can be divinely 
influenced.23 Romans 8:5 implicates the 
presence of an alternating and conflicting set 
of desires: ones “according to the flesh” and 
ones “in accordance with the Spirit.” This 
message indicates a conscious abolition of 
desires originating from selfish genes in turn 
for a supranormal altruism that is distinct 
from even psychosocial or environmental 
influences altogether. 
 The debate over the plausibility of 
literal altruism is not excused by 
relinquishing of personal desire in exchange 
for a supernatural one. An individual still 
must consciously pursue a selfish desire of 
transcending inherent selfishness; 
selflessness is limited by the existence of the 
self and logically, to be purely selfless, one 
would have to have never existed initially. 
This debate aside, individuals confuse the 
association of selflessness (as a radically 
pure concept) with the status of morality. 
From a Christian standpoint, “one does not 
have to be exclusively giving or refrain from 
any reciprocity to found in the divine order 
of love.”24 This is evident as the apostle Paul 
describes in Romans 8:16-`7 (NIV) that as 
“co-heirs with Christ… we share in his 
suffering so that we may also share in his 
glory.” Suffering indicates an altruistic 
sacrifice as exemplified by Jesus, while 
glory is a reciprocal benefit in response to 
the action. Delineations of right and wrong 
within prosocial behaviors ascribe that 
altruism, with awareness of benefit, does not 
implicate immorality, but altruism with 
intent for benefit does. 
 
Conclusion 
 With altruism being a primary 
conduit for Christian apologetics, it is 
important to correct indiscriminate 
applications of this concept by clearly 
defining the roles of the self within altruistic 
behaviors. To promote that a morally 
derived form of altruism is one of complete 
and literal sacrifice of self is to promote a 
contradiction against the existence of the 
self; it also reduces morally derived self-
sacrifice to an impossibility. If the proper 
acknowledgement of a realistic reciprocal 
altruism is accepted, then divine altruism 
emerges within theological systems as a 
means for prosocial interactions that do not 
eliminate morality via the presence of 
reciprocal benefit. Similarly, while 
Dawkins’ selfish gene theory 
methodologically advances understanding of 
some altruistic behavioral influences, it 
ontologically reduces the complexity of 
altruism to these small genomic elements. 
The consequence of this is a naturalistic 
fallacy that eliminates both the existence of 
more complex systems (brain, social 
environment, psychology) and the potential 
for positive integration of religion and 
science.  
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